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INTRODUCTION  
 
Engaging with an audit firm is a significant corporate governance 
mechanism in to order to alleviate several disorders or conflicts 
which can be created in a company‟s internal environment. Taking 
in consideration many scandals that have happened the previous 
years, it is obvious that the compelling need of the investors, 
companies and public for reliable and precise financial information is 
continuously growing. Generally, auditing can provide better quality 
regarding the financial information that investors receive which 
results in the mitigation of information asymmetries. In such 
occasions, the capital inflow in the company can be achieved more 
easily and in a subsequent lower cost of capital. As regards the 
internal benefits of auditing, the company can deal with the agency 
costs that arise and are responsible for a majority of corporate 
failures.  Additionally, auditing can amplify a company‟s process 
effectiveness and regulatory compliance. The choice of a specific 
auditor is not a simple decision and varies across the firms since 
every company has its own incentives and evaluates each auditor 
using different criteria. According to Wallace (1981), there are a lot 
of benefits for a company to hire an auditor such as reduction in 
information asymmetries, improvement of operational effectiveness, 
higher adjustment in specific regulatory environments. The 
optimum mix of these benefits seems to be taken into account by 
every firm when it comes to deal with the auditor choice. For a 
public company, shareholders primarily care about the elimination 
of disastrous information asymmetries and the reduction of the 
capital cost, stemming from the reliable financial statements and 
the related information. Non public companies might view the 
auditor choice from a different perspective. They probably focus on 
issues regarding operation and process efficiency and effectiveness, 
or legal constraints. Since the audit value and benefits vary across 
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different organizations it can be assumed that the auditor choice 
depend on specific clients‟ characteristics. Throughout this 
dissertation, different hypotheses about the determinants of auditor 
choice are tested. After applying the quantitative method of 
regression analysis some interesting findings are presented 
regarding the internally-driven and external influencers of auditor 
choice. Taking into account previous related literature reviews and 
researches, the variables that included in the regression model was 
the internal complexity and size of a company, its leverage degree, 
its need for external financing and its financial distress level. In the 
research were included data from 3.728 listed companies based on 
22 European countries(German, France, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, 
Latvia, Norway, Finland, UK, Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovakia, Poland). Opposite to the predicted outcome, the 
level of internal complexity in a company seems to have a negative 
association with the selection of a Big-4 auditor. The two variables 
added in order to test the first hypothesis, provide us with diverging 
assumptions which will be fully analyzed in the related part of the 
dissertation. The way of financing of a firm is quite a significant 
variable according to the formulated econometric model. The higher 
the leverage level of a company, the higher the probability to 
engage with a Big-4auditor. The variable of the percentage growth 
of sales which was included in order to indicate and associate the 
need for external financing with the determinants of auditor choice 
was found statistically insignificant and was extremely low-weighted 
in the regression model. It is crucial to focus on the last one 
variable reflecting the financial distress of a company. By 
contributing to previous researches, the econometric analysis 
provided an interesting finding regarding the specific determinant. 
Z-score had the largest estimated coefficient in the regression 
analysis accompanied with a negative sign, which means that 
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companies facing the risk of bankruptcy are more likely to choose a 
non Big-4 auditor. Further analysis about the possible explanations 
of the generated outcomes is presented in the following parts of the 
master dissertation. The next part is consisted of a general 
literature review, representing different perspectives and authors‟ 
views. After this point, the four hypotheses that are going to be 
testes are formulated, supported by the appropriate explanations.  
Then, useful information regarding the data collection and 
methodology are provided analytically, followed by the results of 
the regression and the related conclusions.  
LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
AUDITING AND ITS IMPORTANCE  
 
Even when it is not mandatory by the national legislation, many 
companies are subjected to external auditing for array reasons. The 
main problem responsible for the majority of the internal conflicts is 
the repercussions of the principal-agent model. Having observed 
many related scandals (Enron, 2001), it is quite a common 
phenomenon a corporate manager to have incentives not 
completely aligned with the owners‟ incentives and interests. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) characterize the structure of a corporation as a 
“nexus of contracts” among different individuals. Within a firm these 
individuals are supposed to desire the fulfillment of their own 
interests and goals by achieving the most beneficial contractual 
relationship. 
Jensen and Meckling attribute the divergence between ownership 
and management to the fact the managers do not maintain a 
complete residual claim. Subsequently, if management acts in a 
way to boost the company‟s profits, they do not receive the full 
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return on their efforts accomplished while deals with the negative 
aspects the effort‟s cost. Thus, there is a significant incentive for 
managers to adjust their efforts in order to achieve their personal 
goals – of which they can gain full benefits. Due to these agency 
costs, there are equivalent ways in which ownership tries to control 
managerial behavior and actions. It is not rare the fact that owners 
increase debt with a view to smooth the divergence of interests 
between ownership and management. Jensen contends that debt 
enforces the firm to commit part of the cash in order to pay back 
the company‟s liabilities. This consequently diminishes the available 
cash accessible to the management. 
Grossman and Hart (1983) also mention that the increase of debt 
can be used effectively in order to restrain the behavior of the 
agents-managers. They believe that excessive debt liabilities 
increase the possibility of bankruptcy of a firm. Although the 
managers will not be legally responsible for this, they may view 
bankruptcy negatively to them (fear of losing their jobs). As a 
result, increased debt will make managers work harder without 
exploiting the cash flows of the firm for the accomplishment of their 
own ambitions and make more efficient investment choices. By 
hiring an external auditor the information asymmetries caused by 
the principal-agent model can be mitigated and both the agent‟s 
and manager‟s incentives can converge.  
The cornerstone of a continuous and sustainable development of a 
company is the attraction of investors who can provide the firm with 
the appropriate capital inflows crucial for the completion of strategic 
investments. Investors need reliable, accurate and timely 
information in order to trust their money in a firm. (Knechel and 
Williams, 2006). Financial statements that have been audited and 
monitored by an external auditor are supposed to be more 
trustworthy in the business word than those that have not. Lenders, 
investors and potential clients often demand audited financial 
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statements before making the decision to cooperate with a specific 
firm. Financial statements verified by external auditors gives 
lenders, stakeholders and potential investors some security that the 
financial statements are free of error and that have not been 
committed illegal actions  while composing the statements to secure 
a loan, or a new investment.  
 
THE AUDITOR CHOICE VARIABLES 
EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS  
 
When a company decides to engage with a specific auditor 
regarding the external monitoring that will be exerted, it has to take 
into account various aspects before dealing with the audit firm. One 
of the most significant characteristics is the cost the company will 
be charged in order to be audited. Management has to analyze the 
marginal costs and benefits regarding the auditor and conclude to 
the most beneficial choice. According to previous researches 
(Simunic,1986; Francis and Simon,1987; Shivakumar,2004), it is 
expected a Big-4 auditor to charge higher prices, something that 
should definitely be taken into account before making the decision. 
The concept is that auditors of large corporations have to spend 
enough time and effort on examining and analyzing the financial 
statements and all the related information of the firm. 
Another important characteristic is the size of the audit firm. 
According to DeAngelo (1981), a company‟s financial statements 
verified by a large audit firm depict higher levels of confidence in 
the marketplace compared to the financial information audited by 
smaller audit firms. It is generally accepted that the size of a 
company is positively related with the quality of the services it 
provides. Thus, since managers‟ criterion involved the auditor 
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choice is the quality of the services it is provided, it is assumed that 
the size of the audit firm is a determinant, too. 
Embracing the theory of DeAngelo (1981), since the agency costs 
are not the same, the demand for audit monitoring is different too, 
depicting different levels of audit quality. According to this finding 
we can infer that quality plays a major role in the selection of the 
auditor. Previous researches on audit quality have focused on the 
differences between Big-4 audit firms and non Big-4 audit firms. 
DeAngelo (1981) also supports that the Big-4 provide superior 
quality audits because they face excessive reputational and legal 
risk. Analyzing findings from various studies we can infer that audits 
by the Big-4 are associated with higher fees (Simunic,1986; Francis 
and Simon,1987; Shivakumar), lower levels of discretionary 
accruals (Francis et al. 1999), higher rates of compliance with GAAP 
(Krishnan and Schaur 2000), more informative indications of 
financial instability and distress and less mispricing of IPOs (Menon 
& Williams,1991). Consequently, companies with a tendency to 
report adjusted earnings will probably not choose a larger audit 
firm. On the contrary, when a company desires to increase its 
disclosure quality with a view to prove its financial stability in the 
eyes of the stakeholders has the incentive to hire a Big-4 auditor.  
 
INTERNALLY DRIVEN VARIABLES 
 
The conventional theory of principal-agent problems states that 
there may be conflicts between managers and ownership due to the 
misalignment of incentives and interests (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The separation between ownership and control of the firm 
results into many information asymmetries, which permits 
managers to act against the benefits of the shareholders and exploit 
the financial assets of the company they are involved in. However, 
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this phenomenon exists in firms whose ownership is dispersed 
among a lot of shareholders. According to the finding of La Porta et 
al. (1999), dispersed ownership is more common in marketplaces of 
a few developed countries, such as the United States and United 
Kingdom, unlike with the European environment this dissertation is 
based on. Thus, the above theory does not apply in a company with 
concentrated ownership, where the largest shareholder has the 
control of the firm. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that highly-
concentrated shareholdings and a prevalence of controlling 
ownership express the form of corporate governance at the majority 
of capital markets all over the world. In these firms, the agency 
problem may arise between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders, where the former have the ability to enjoy 
the company‟s earnings in a more advantageous way at the 
expense of the latter (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).The benefits from 
the possession of control tend to be higher in firms with a higher 
level of ownership concentration, as well as in less-developed 
marketplaces with inadequate minority shareholders protection. 
Based on all the above information we can infer that in the interest 
of concealing the expropriation of minority investors, controlling 
shareholders may not choose a Big-4 auditor to deliberately provide 
distorted financial information. According to previous findings (La 
Porta et al.; 1999, El Ghoul; 2007) we know that companies in less 
developed marketplaces, as the European, the ownership is 
concentrated among family members. Usually families continue to 
have significant stakes even if they are not involved in the 
company‟s management (Burkart et al., 2003). Regarding this 
aspect of the determinant choice, previous studies depict 
contradictory arguments. Based on De Angelo (2000), family 
shareholders are more likely to act in a way that allows them to 
expropriate the weaker shareholders by specific management of 
dividend yields. On the other hand Anderson et al., (2003) supports 
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that companies which are under family control have no incentive to 
conceal the true performance of the company and their incentives 
are aligned with the interests of the non controlling investors. Thus, 
these firms who care about their reputation and their survival and 
intend to pass to the next generation will not achieve increased 
quality if the auditing of their financial statements is verified by a 
Big-4 auditor. El Ghoul et al. (2009), presents a perspective of how 
the presence of many shareholders affects the agency problems. 
According to his findings, the existence of multiple controlling 
shareholders intensifies the internal monitoring and results in a 
more efficient control and prevention of opportunistic behaviors. 
Consequently, in these types of ownership structure there are not 
strong incentives to hire a Big-4 auditor. Finally, another aspect 
which affects the company‟s decision to hire a certain auditor is the 
existence of outside members to the board of directors. Fama 
(1980) supports that the independent directors are introduced in 
the firm‟s environment in order to mitigate the conflicts between 
the managers and the shareholders. Outside members have less 
incentives to distort the financial information provided to the 
stakeholders compared to the inside directors. Consequently, the 
involvement of outside members is positively associated with the 
selection of a high-quality auditor. 
 
DISTINCTION OF AUDITORS 
 
The audit firms are categorized as high-quality auditors and non- 
high-quality auditors. Previous researches have estimated the 
variables that can categorize a specific auditor as a high-quality 
one. Since the costs derived from the principal-agent problem are 
not the same and can change over the time, the demand for audit 
monitoring is different too, depicting different levels of audit quality.   
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The companies‟ need for different levels of quality can affect their 
choice regarding the audit firm they intend to engage with. A firm is 
willing to hire a specific auditor with a view to reap the benefits of 
external monitoring adjusted to its current level of needed quality. 
According to De Angelo (1981), “the quality of audit services is 
defined to be the market-assessed joint probability that a given 
auditor will both discover a breach in the client‟s accounting system 
and report the breach‟. She also argued that the measurement of 
quality can be indicated by the size of the audit firm. Large audit 
firms‟ clients are much more compared to the smaller audit firms‟ 
hence they have no incentive to be involved in misstatements 
regarding a specific client. Moreover, its reputation plays more 
significant role that in the case of a small audit firm (Simunic and 
Stein, 1997). As a result, big audit firms face higher risk to be 
involved in a situation that could damage its reputation. Another 
indicator of the services‟ quality an auditor provides are the fees it 
charges. Many different studies (Simunic; 1983, Francis and Wang; 
2008) investigate the relationship between audit-firm premiums as 
a determinant of audit quality. They explain that large Big-4 audit 
firms charge higher fees compared to the non-Big-4 as an indicator 
of their higher quality monitoring services they provide. This fee 
premium has generally been characterized as a sign of 
“differentiation‟‟, meaning that the clients may have this perception 
even if it is not real. The authors have concluded in a positive 
relation between the high prices charged and other quality 
measures and suggest that higher audit fees are an indication of 
higher real or perceived audit quality. Thus, it is generally accepted 
that when we refer to Big-4 auditors we define them as high-quality 
auditors. Big-4 auditors are comprised of: 
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 Ernst & Young  
 Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu   
 KPMG   
 PriceWaterhouseCoopers  
 
 
THE AUDIOR CHOICE DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Undoubtedly, issues regarding the worldwide financial crisis have 
gained the protagonist‟s role in the references of the mass media.  
During 2007, America faced the tremendous consequences of a 
banking crisis which led to the collapse of large financial institutions, 
the bailout of banks (Lehman Brothers, 2008) and downturns in 
stock markets. A couple of years later the repercussions of the 
financial crisis were obvious in the European Union, too. Euro zone 
tried to reform its monetary and fiscal policies but some members 
seemed to face significant problems. Greece‟s huge government 
budget deficit caused an extreme widening of the bond yield 
spreads and only the International Monetary Fund could finance its 
deficit since the trustworthiness of the country was suffering.  
The cornerstone of a business‟s survival among such a volatile and 
unstable economic environment is to remain dependable and 
reliable in the eyes of the stakeholders and the shareholders. In 
order to achieve this it is crucial to hire auditors who convey 
unqualified and accurate opinion with regard to the financial 
statements of a company. Investors need reliable, accurate and 
timely information in order to invest their money in a firm. (Knechel 
and Williams, 2006).  During the crisis, many have accused auditors 
of not signaling the financial distress of their clients and not 
protecting the public. The rationale is that the management of the 
company is responsible for disclosing issues related with its financial 
condition. It is quite often, in periods when firms face difficulties to 
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switch auditors.  However, a company can change its auditors due 
to many reasons such as general disagreements, high audit fees or 
changes in the company control. Especially, when a company 
decides to go through the Initial Public Offerings (Menon & 
Williams,1991) it is important to choose a Big-4 auditor with a view 
to attract more investments, signaling that it performs under 
healthy and reliable conditions. In a period of extensive recession 
the role of the auditor become much more crucial. In an unstable 
economy it is difficult to make accurate estimates and the hazard of 
a bankruptcy in case you did not make the right decision is much 
higher.  
Another aspect which must be mentioned, although it is not referred 
to the whole European market, is the recent liberalization of the 
auditing profession in Greece and its importance. The full 
liberalization was enforced by the IMF and the consequent 
undersigned obligations that Greece has been subjected to by the 
European Union. Auditing in no longer a closed profession with 
restrained audit fess, meaning that there is the opportunity for a 
company to charge higher audit fees. However, in a period of crisis 
this could be a reason for a company to choose its audit firm under 
the criterion of the related cost savings. According to prior 
researches a continued audit success depends on the way the 
various challenges appeared are handled in an effective way. 
(Bromwich & Hopwood,1982). The worldwide crisis we are still 
going through is absolutely a great challenge.  A major reason for a 
firm to change auditor is the amount of the audit fees charged. 
According to Shivakumar (2004), the fees required to hire a Big-4 
auditor are much higher than hiring a non Big-4 auditor. During a 
recession is quite likely that a company will choose a non Big-4 in 
order to save some costs. Another interesting research shows us 
that failing companies, which have increased significantly during the 
period of the global financial crisis, are more engaged in auditors‟ 
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switching compared to healthier firms. (Eichenseher, J.W., 
D.Shields, 1983). Relying on this finding we can infer that 
companies with long debts are likely to choose an auditor of a high 
quality.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNAL COMPLEXITY AND THE 
AUDITOR CHOICE 
 
Auditing can provide substantial benefits to the internal 
environment of a corporation such as increased efficiency, better 
compliance with the legal environment, increased disclosure quality 
and lower rates of incidents stemming from information 
asymmetries. The benefits of this external monitoring are related to 
the various components of internal complexity of the audited firm. 
When the size of the company is small allows the management to 
control effectively on its own the function of the firm. On the 
contrary, when a company increases its size it becomes difficult to 
control all the actions and the operations inside the company‟s 
environment. Consequently, in a large company the agency 
problems that arise are more significant compared to a smaller one. 
The delegation of responsibilities becomes more difficult and the 
process of monitoring can be deteriorated as the observability in 
every hierarchical level is reduced. In these situations managers 
face a growing demand of filtering the actions of the management 
in order to avoid opportunistic behaviors that can affect the financial 
assets of the company. As has been mentioned and analyzed in this 
dissertation the involvement of external monitoring can provide 
solutions with regard to the above problems and support the owners 
in controlling effectively the operational flow of their company.   
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Knechel et al. (2008) and many other researches, contend that 
large companies characterized by excessive internal complexity are 
more likely to choose a Big-4 auditor. An important aspect that has 
to be stated is the relationship between the cost of monitoring and 
the growing size of a firm. It is obvious that the fixed costs related 
to the auditing are reduced as the size of the company grows. 
Moreover, the initial monitoring is usually the same for a company 
despite its size since the auditing includes the verification of balance 
sheets and other financial information. The variable expenses 
increase with a lower rate that the firm‟s size and this results in a 
lower marginal cost. Additionally, when a specific auditor is engaged 
with a firm for a long period, it is more familiarized with the 
specifications and needs of its client. So, it becomes easier and less 
costly for the auditor to exert the auditing process. According to the 
above findings the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H1: Companies with high internal complexity are more likely to hire 
a Big-4 auditor. 
 
There are two variables that are used in order to measure the 
internal complexity of the firm. The first is the variable IVREC and 
calculates the ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets. It 
has been generally used by many relevant researches (Knechel; 
2008), and reflects the level of transactions accomplished by the 
firm. The specific variable is expected to have a positive association 
with the selection of a Big-4 auditor since it indicates the internally 
driven complexity of the firm. The second variable included in the 
regression model is the SIZE and is determined by the total assets 
of a company. It is assumed that the model will result in a positive 
association between this variable and the selection of a high-quality 
auditor. 
  
 
[16] 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEGREE OF LEVERAGE AND THE 
AUDITOR CHOICE  
 
External debt can create significant problems between the 
shareholders and the debt holders. According to Jensen and 
Meckling, agency issues arise and depict the misalignment of 
interests of these two parts. Sometimes, management‟s actions can 
benefit the shareholders in the expense of the creditors. This could 
happen either through a change in the dividend payout policy or 
through the selection of specific alternative investment with high 
discounted present value but excessive risk. It is widely known that 
creditors face significantly higher risk compared to the 
shareholders, since in a case of bankruptcy the potential loss of the 
former exceeds to a great extend the harm that shareholders are 
going to be subjected to. Jensen and Meckling also contend that the 
agency problems in the relationship of the two parts are 
exacerbated as the debt of a company increases. Normally, for a 
firm with existing debt liabilities it will be more difficult to cover the 
new interest expenses. It is widely accepted in the literature that 
engaging with a Big-4 auditor indicates more safety for the 
investors and this can lead to relatively lower effective interest rates 
for the borrower. Taking into account all the above findings, 
similarly to many other researches, the following hypothesis is 
tested: 
 
H2: High-leveraged companies are more likely to hire a Big-4 
auditor. 
 
The variable LIAB_ASSETS is included in the test of the above 
hypothesis. The variable derives from the calculation of total 
liabilities to total assets of the company. Although many researchers 
have used different definitions of leverage, the chosen ratio is 
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widely considered as the main indicator of the debt proportion in a 
firm. Generally, is accepted that there is a positive relationship 
between the auditor choice and the level of leverage in a company, 
although similar studies have concluded in arguing findings. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) contend that a high degree of leverage 
indicates an amplified financial risk for the company hence 
managers would avoid any decision that could deteriorate the value 
of the firm. On the contrary, they could hire a non-Big-4 auditor 
with a view any financial distress and earnings variations to remain 
concealed. Broye and Weill (2008), after conducting a relevant 
research in the European countries, found that there are great 
variations between the auditor choice and the debt of a company 
stemming from the legal environment in which the companies were 
activated 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEED FOR EXTERNAL FINANCING 
AND THE AUDITOR CHOICE 
 
It is inevitable for many firms to require additional external 
financing in order to extend their business, to fulfill research and 
development actions and to achieve some growth of their entity. 
When a need for external financing arises, normally the companies 
will firstly try to gain the needed capital through the financial 
institutions. The accomplishment of capital inflow in a company is 
proportional to the risk the investors face by providing financing to 
it. If the risk is low the subsequent cost of capital for the company 
will be at lower levels, too. It is quite important for the investors to 
gain precise information about the collateral they receive and to 
avoid distorting accounting methods which overestimate the value 
of these collaterals. They want reliable information especially when 
they intend to invest on a company that is engaged with complex 
operations. Pittman and Fortin (2004) have found evidence that 
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companies can achieve a lower effective interest rate when is 
verified by a high- quality auditor. 
 
H3: A company with high need of external financing is more likely to 
be engaged with a Big-4 auditor. 
 
In order to measure the need for external financing of a company 
the variable SALESGROWTH is included and represents the 
percentage sales growth of the firm the last year. When the sales 
are increased, the company‟s operations are extended and 
consequently the inflow of additional financial resources will be 
needed. Then, the company has to choose the most cost effective 
way to support and finance its operations. If the free cash flow of 
the firm is not adequate, seeking for a borrower probably is the 
next solution. Since, the investors need reliable and precise 
information in order to invest their money in a financially healthy 
company, it is assumed that a high-quality auditor would intensify 
their confidence and trust in a specific company. Thus, it is 
expected to exist a positive relationship between this variable and 
the choice of a Big-4 auditor.  
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND THE 
AUDITOR CHOICE  
 
The outbreak of the financial crisis during the 2008 has caused 
innumerable cases of bankruptcies and general financial distress in 
the business world. Performing in such a volatile environment can 
affect the company‟s decision regarding the characteristics of the 
audit firm it will cooperate with. After having analyzed previous 
related researches, it was found that the theories about this 
variable express quite different views. In accordance with Grossman 
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and Hart (1982), companies which experience financial distress and 
risk of bankruptcy, will try to maintain and increase any favorable 
view they possess in the marketplace. Therefore, it is more likely to 
prefer engaging with a auditor of high-quality which could mitigate 
the impact of the company‟s performance on the investors‟ 
decisions. Moreover, a Big-4 auditor is supposed to provide a more 
effective monitoring of the company‟s debt liabilities. Francis & 
Wilson, 1988, have concluded in converging findings.  Companies 
which are insolvent and are characterized by unhealthy financial 
condition are more likely to hire audit firms with recognized 
independence in order to intensify the confidence of investors and 
creditors as well as to alleviate the litigation risk. On the contrary, 
Titman and Truman (1986) have concluded in an opposite 
perspective. They support that when a company undergoes difficult 
financial conditions, it is more likely to hire a non-Big-4 auditor in 
order to hide or distort the level of financial distress they 
experience. As it is mentioned already in this dissertation, the Big-4 
auditors are considered to be of greater quality compared to non-
Big-4 audit firms. Since they maintain a large clientele and they are 
not dependent in specific clients they have no incentives to perform 
distorting of disclosure quality issues. Additionally, they would not 
be eager to decrease their reputation and brand-name associations 
as these aspects are strongly interrelated with the high fees 
charged for their services. By contributing to previous researches 
the following hypothesis is tested. Since, the evidence from the 
related studies are diverging it is not easy to predict the outcome of 
the specific analysis. 
 
H4: Companies experiencing financial distress are more likely to hire 
a Big-4 auditor. 
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The variable Z-SCORE included in the econometric model is 
indicative of a corporation‟s financial distress. This variable reflects 
the widely used Z-score model, introduced by Altman (1968). 
Altman‟s findings support that the Z-Score is a precise forecaster of 
bankruptcy up to two years. The Z-Score model has retained its 
great accuracy and is still well-recognized despite being introduced 
over 40 years ago. Gradually, the Z-Score model has become a 
popular technique for analyzing, as it has proved to be one of the 
most effective statistical models for measuring the financial position 
of a company and calculating the probability of bankruptcy within   
2 years. This is the reason I decided to include the Z-Score model 
as an indicator of a company‟s distress.  The specific multivariate 
model combines significant ratios that affect the financial condition 
of a company and is formulated as: 
 
Z= 1.2(X1) + 1.4(X2) + 3.3(X3) + 0.6(X4) + 1.0(X5) 
Where X1 = working capital/total assets, 
          X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
          X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
          X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
          X5 = sales/total assets 
 
Value definition: 
Z > 2.99 Safe Zone: Financially healthy company 
1.81 < Z < 2.99 Grey Zone: Company with financial instability but               
not facing the risk of bankruptcy 
Z < 1.81 Distress Zone: Risk that company will declare bankruptcy    
within two years  
 
Since, Z-score constitutes a dummy variable which can take value 1 
or 0, companies categorized in the grey zone, defined as financial 
stressed or not based on how close were to the value boundaries.   
 
[21] 
 
Due to the fact that there was a wide range regarding the values of 
the specific variable, only few companies defined in the grey zone 
needed to be adjusted. The lower the z-score for a company, the 
higher the financial distress it faces. For the formulation of the 
above model some relevant financial ratios are used with different 
coefficients which indicate the importance of its ratio. Based on 
Altman, a brief description of its ration in presented: 
 
Working capital/Total assets 
Working capital is the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities and is related to the liquidity of an examined company. 
Total assets comprise the current and fixed assets and depict the 
size of the company. When a firm is operating under unhealthy 
financial conditions, is supposed to experience reduced current 
assets compared to the total assets.  
 
Retained earnings/Total assets 
Retained earnings are the amount of reinvested earnings or losses 
of a firm. It is a signal of accumulated profitability over the years. 
Companies which operate many years are more likely to preserve 
large amounts of retained earnings and to deal with a financial 
difficulty over the time. This is the reason that most firms who 
declare a bankruptcy count few years of existence. The specific ratio 
is considered to measure the level of leverage in a company. 
Increased value of retained earnings to total assets means that a 
company is able to finance its assets o its own and will not be 
subjected to debt obligations. 
 
 
Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
This ratio calculates the productivity of a company‟s assets and 
seems to have the highest importance of all the variables in the Z-
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score model. This is why it is multiplied with the highest coefficient 
in the model‟s equation. The amount of earnings before interest and 
taxes indicates the level of efficiency with regard to the operations 
of a firm and is crucial for its development and sustainability. 
 
Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities  
The market value of equity is the market capitalization of a firm and 
is found by multiplying the number of shares with their price. The 
book value of total liabilities is the sum on current and long-term 
liabilities as they are presented in the financial statements. This 
ratio measures how much the assets of the company can be 
reduced in order to maintain its liabilities in relatively lower levels 
and remain viable. It is also indicative of the leverage degree and 
the subsequent financial risk a firm may face due to excessive debt. 
Last but not least, in this ratio is included the view of the stock in 
the market. When the stock price of a firm remains in high levels, it 
will easier for the firm to raise additional capital through equity 
issues. A fall in the stock price may be a signal for upcoming 
unfavorable events. Thus, the systematic risk which is crucial in a 
financially unstable environment is internalized to some extent 
through the Z-score model.  
 
Sales/Total assets 
The value of the above ratio is widely used to measure the ability of 
a company‟s assets to generate sales. It shows how effectively the 
company responds to the requirements of a competitive 
environment. The value of the sales is the one reported in the 
Income Statement. 
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DATA COLLECTION 
 
In order to obtain the appropriate information needed for the 
accomplishment of the specific dissertation, I used the database of 
ThomsonOne. Through this database you can extract the most 
recent financial information for a wide range of companies. The 
sample used in the econometric model consists of 3.728 listed 
companies based in the Europe. (German, France, Austria, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, 
Italy, Greece, Latvia, Norway, Finland, UK, Portugal, Sweden, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Poland). At this point, it should be 
mentioned that the proportion of data availability is not the same 
for every country since we refer to different financial environments 
and conditions. ThomsonOne updates its data frequently thus 
information about the previous fiscal year was collected in order to 
process the following analysis. Companies and organizations with 
specific characteristics in their financial statements are not 
concluded in the sample in order to avoid producing any kind of 
biased results.  
 
 
THE REGRESSION MODEL 
 
Having conducted a broad review with regard to the related 
literature, four hypotheses are tested with a view to determine the 
influencers of auditor choice. The variables analyzed in the above 
section of the dissertation are formulated in a regression model:  
 
Auditor_Choice= C +a1*IVREC + a2*ASSETS + a3*LIAB_ASSETS 
+ a4*SALESGROWTH +a5*Z_SCORE + a6*ROA 
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The dependent variable is a dummy one which becomes 1 when the 
company is engaged with a Big-4 auditor and 0 when it is verified 
by a non Big-4 auditor.  The variables IVREC and ASSETS support 
the analysis of the first hypothesis. The former is the ratio of 
receivables and inventories to total assets and is indicative of the 
transactional complexity of the company. The latter is the value of 
the total assets which are reported in the financial statements of 
every company and depict the size of the company. The variable 
LIAB_ASSETS is calculated as the ratio of current ant long-term 
liabilities to total assets. The specific ratio which compares the debt 
to equity reflects the leverage volume of the examined companies 
and is used in order to define the association between the auditor 
choice and leverage degree, analyzed in the second hypothesis. 
SALESGROWTH represents the percentage growth in sales of the 
sample‟s companies.  It is engaged with the third hypothesis, about 
the relationship between the auditor choice and the firms‟ need for 
external financing. The last one variable Z_SCORE characterizes the 
likelihood a company to declare bankruptcy in a time period of two 
years. As was analyzed in previous part of the dissertation the 
equation that formulates the z-score is the following:  
Z= 1.2(X1) + 1.4(X2) + 3.3(X3) + 0.6(X4) + 1.0(X5) 
Where X1 = working capital/total assets, 
          X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
          X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
          X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
          X5 = sales/total assets 
Since it was suggested generally in the related literature and 
conducted in similar studies, the variable ROA was added in the 
regression model, too. ROA is defined as the ratio of profit or loss to 
the total assets of a company.  
 
[25] 
 
The information for all the needed data were extracted from the 
companies‟ financial statements which were available at the 
ThomsonOne database.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Since the dependent variable we examine is qualitative the 
methodology that is applied is the logistic regression model. The 
method of Ordinary Least Squares could not lead to reliable 
outcomes as it generates many weaknesses when it has to deal with 
qualitative variables. Logistic regression is an approach to 
prediction, like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. By 
performing a logistic regression, is tested a dichotomous outcome. 
These conditions create obstacles for the assumptions of OLS that 
the error variances (residuals) are normally distributed. Instead, 
they are more likely to follow a logistic distribution. Therefore, is 
inevitable that the interpretation of the generated results in a 
logistic regression is much more complicated compared to the 
method of the Ordinary Least Squares. Due to the fact that the 
dependent variable is not a continuous one, the function of logistic 
regression is different to some extent, because the model predicts 
the likelihood that Y is equal to 1 (rather than 0) when the inputs of 
the variable X are certain . That is, if X and Y have a positive linear 
relationship, the probability that the score of Y = 1 will increase as 
values of X increase. Thus, the model is applied with a view to 
predict probabilities rather than the scores of dependent variable. 
However, the OLS method was applied additionally to the main 
model of the logistic regression in order to compare the results of 
the two models. Heteroskedasticity was tested in the residuals of 
our additional OLS regression by employing White‟s test for 
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heteroskedasticity. The null of homoscedastic residuals was tested 
against the alternative that the residuals exhibit heteroskedasticity. 
White‟s test yields a value of 𝑛𝑅2=270,8623, where n is the number 
of observations in our sample and 𝑅2 is the unadjusted coefficient of 
determination from the auxiliary regression of our test statistic. 
Comparing this value against the value of the chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
regressors in the auxiliary regression, excluding the constant, of our 
test statistic (26 in our case) we can reject the null of 
homoscedasticity at every conventional significance level (p-value 
of 0.000) and conclude that the residuals of our OLS regression are 
heteroskedastic. However, despite the presence of the 
heteroskedasticity in the OLS model the sign of the estimated 
coefficients and the significance levels are the same with the 
outcomes of the logistic regression.   
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
In the following tables are reported the outcomes of the statistical 
methods used. Firstly, some basic descriptive statistics are 
presented in order to depict a general overview of the variables‟ 
values. Out of the 3.728 observations included in the model it was 
found that 2.316 companies were audited by a Big-4 auditor 
whereas 1.412 chose a non Big-4 auditor. Based on the findings of 
Broye and Weil (2008), listed companies are more likely to select a 
high-quality auditor since they have great incentives to signal their 
intention to provide precise and reliable financial information. 
Furthermore, they are subjected to more complex environments 
and larger international networks.  The mean value of the variable 
IVREC is around 0.306 which is close to the findings of similar 
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researches. The variable DEBT_ASSETS reflects a mean value of 
1,222 which is a bit high compared to the optimum values of the 
certain ratio. However, we must take into consideration that all the 
data were reported within a period which is characterized by a 
global unstable financial environment and deep recession. Thus, 
many ratios regarding the leverage and the relevant financial 
information probably incorporate this difficult economic situation. 
Additionally, the ratio ROA with a mean value of -2,94 indicates the 
previously described conditions in the European marketplace. 
However, as it is reported in the table with the descriptive statistics 
the percentage growth of the companies‟ sales represents a positive 
outcome. Due to the fact that the variance of this variable‟s values 
is high, it would be more helpful to focus on the median value in 
order not to misinterpret the estimated results. Thus, the median 
value of the variable SALESGROWTH is 3,475, meaning that most 
companies has an increase in the volume of their sales. Finally, in 
the appendices we can see some interesting findings about the 
variable Z_SCORE which was included in the model in order to 
determine the relationship between the financial distress and the 
auditor choice. The specific variable is a dummy one, which takes a 
value 1 if a company‟s z-score indicates high probability of a future 
bankruptcy or a value 0 when the company belongs to the „safe 
zone‟. According to the statistical results we can infer that a large 
proportion of the examined companies are subjected to tough 
financial conditions. This is another sign of the general financial 
recession that prevails in the marketplaces the last years. Out of 
the 3.728 companies of the sample, there are 1.372 observations of 
firms which are characterized from financial distress. Regarding 
these companies, 794(57,871%) are engaged with a non-Big-4 
auditor, whereas the remained 578(42,128%) have chosen a high-
quality auditor. After having investigated the behavior of the binary 
dependent variable it can be concluded that the descriptive 
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statistics are in accordance with the results of the regression 
analysis which are presented in the following section of the 
dissertation.  
 
 
 
Number of defaults 1372  
 Big- 4 auditors   578 0,421283 
Non Big- 4 auditors   794 0,578717 
                       Table 2 descriptive statistics 
 
The results of the regressions analysis are reported at the table 3. 
As we can see the variables added to test the first hypothesis are, 
INVREC and ASSETS, have both statistically significant 
coefficients(5% level).The former has a negative sign whereas the 
latter a positive one. Contrary to the prediction that was made at 
the hypothesis development part, the negative sign of IVREC 
depicts that firms with excessive transactional complexity are less 
likely to hire a Big-4 auditor. This issue might be interrelated with 
the fact that the firms choose different corporate governance 
mechanisms in order to control, to alleviate or to conceal any 
problems that could stem from the transactional complexity they 
are dealing with. The estimated coefficient of ASSETS is positive but 
 IVREC   ASSETS DEBT_ASSETS SALESGROWTH               ROA 
Mean 0.306394 3332.307 1.222187 131.2622 -2.942967 
Median 0.285931 150.9450 0.522106 3.475000 3.330000 
Std. Dev. 0.207594 17310.99 36.44870 5046.072 35.83656 
Skewness 0.521591 12.26818 60.26215 56.58020 -6.286876 
Kurtosis 2.712006 201.7290 3660.695 3317.977 129.9974 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 1142.235 12422841 4556.314 489345.6 -10971.38 
Sum Sq. Dev. 160.6165 1.12E+12 4951348. 9.49E+10 4786435. 
Observations 3728 3728 3728 3728 3728 
         Table 1 descriptive statistics 
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low-weighted. In accordance with the findings in the literature 
review, larger firms are more eager to hire Big-4 auditor in order to 
achieve a better control of their entity since responsibilities are 
delegated among a lot of organizational levels. The second 
hypothesis is tested by including the variable DEBT_ASSETS which 
is statistically significant with an estimated coefficient of 0.182. The 
value of the coefficient and the positive sign in the regression 
analysis allow us to believe that this variable is quite significant with 
regard to the selection of audit firm. According to Jensen and 
Meckling, in highly leveraged companies, agency issues can arise 
and depict the misalignment of interests between the shareholders 
and the debt holders. Consequently, firms with large debts 
compared to its total assets are more likely to select a high-quality 
auditor. This finding is in accordance with the initial prediction made 
in the hypothesis development part of the dissertation although 
some literature review (Broye and Weil; 2008) suggest that in the 
European marketplace the degree of leverage has adverse impacts 
on the auditor selection process due to lack of criteria‟s 
homogenization. The third hypothesis tested the need for external 
financing as a determinant of the auditor choice. The outcome of 
the regression analysis reflects that the variable SALESGROWTH 
included to test the specific hypothesis, is negative but statistically 
insignificant. A possible reason for this is that the equity issuance to 
outsiders is a relatively ambiguous aspect among the examined 
companies. The added variable Z_SCORE shows us important 
evidence about the association of the auditor choice and the auditor 
selection procedure. As it is inferred from the table where are 
reported the results of the regression analysis, the financial distress 
is the most significant variable in the model. The value of the 
estimated coefficient is 0.645 and the sign is negative. It is 
suggested that firms which operate under financial distress are less 
likely to choose a Big-4 auditor. Grossman and Hart (1982) 
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contended that companies which are insolvent and are 
characterized by unhealthy financial situation are more likely to hire 
audit firms with recognized independence in order to boost the 
confidence of investors and creditors as well as to mitigate the 
litigation risk. On the contrary, Titman and Truman (1986) have 
concluded in an opposite perspective. They support that when a 
company faces issues of financial distress and potential bankruptcy, 
it is more likely to hire a non-Big-4 auditor in order to conceal or 
distort the level of financial distress they experience. The finding of 
the specific research is at convergence with the latter authors‟ 
perspective.  In the regression model was also added the ratio ROA 
as a proxy for the companies‟ profitability. Abbott and Parker 
(2000) supported that Return On Assets is positively associated 
with the engagement of an „differentiated‟ auditor, since a more 
profitable firm is more likely to accept the fee premium charged by 
a generally recognized audit firm. They indeed find a positive 
relationship between ROA and high-quality auditors. On the 
contrary, Citron and Manalis (2001) did not found an important 
difference between the ROA levels of two clients of the two groups 
of auditors- the Big-4 versus the non-Big-4 in the Greek market. 
Additionally, they suggested that the Big- 4 clients are  more 
profitable compared to those of non-Big-4 firms, but surprisingly, 
the clients of local audit firms have higher ROA than those of second 
tier audit firms. In the specific research the ratio ROA appears 
statistically significant but the estimated coefficient reports a low 
value. Possible explanations can derive from the literature review 
provided.  
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Table 3 logistic regression 
 
 
At the last part of the statistical results‟ analysis some basic figures 
about the correlation of the included variables are going to be 
mentioned. As it is reported in the table 4, there is a positive 
relationship between the DEBT_ASSETS and the Z_SCORE which it 
not surprising since highly leveraged companies with large debts 
are more likely to experience a situation of financial distress. It is 
also found that the correlation between the ASSETS and the 
Z_SCORE is negative, which can be explained by the fact that large 
companies with subsequent long history may have accumulated 
profits and can overcome a difficult situation. As was also 
mentioned in the literature review the majority of the bankruptcies 
are experienced in the early years of a company, since it is difficult 
for a firm achieve a satisfying level of accumulated retained profits 
within a short time period. Furthermore, we can notice a negative 
correlation between the variables ASSETS, INVREC and the 
DEBT_ASSETS. A possible explanation might be that large 
companies with increased transactional complexity and high volume 
of assets have managed to gain share capital which can result in 
lower levels of reported total liabilities. Last but not least, it should 
Variable Estimated coefficient 
𝒃  
Standard error p-value Exponentiated 
coefficient 𝐞𝐱𝐩⁡(𝒃)  
C 0.619572 0.078269 0.0000            1.858 
INVREC -0.419107 0.173082 0.0155            0.658 
ASSETS 0.000104 1.58E-
05(0.0000158) 
0.0000            1.000 
DEBT_ASSETS 0.182027 0.080330 0.0235            1.199 
SALESGROWTH -0.000081 9.10E-
06(0.00000910) 
0.3328            0.999 
ROA 0.005719 0.001339 0.0000            1.005 
DEFAULT -0.644783 0.079566 0.0000            0.524 
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be mentioned that the variables ROA and Z_SCORE have the 
strongest correlation value (-0.293955). It can be easily explained 
as the ratio ROA which consists a proxy for a company‟s profitability 
could not have a positive correlation coefficient with the variable 
determining its financial distress.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The aim of this master dissertation is to provide some evidence 
related to the procedure of auditor selection by employing findings 
from previous researches and introducing some new aspects. After 
having collected data from 3.728 listed companies based on 22 
European countries(German, France, Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Latvia, 
Norway, Finland, UK, Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Slovakia, Poland) and analyzed them with the appropriate statistical 
methods the subsequent conclusions have been made up. Out of 
the 3.728 observations included in the model it was found that 
2.316 companies were audited by a Big-4 auditor whereas 1.412 
chose a non Big-4 auditor. In accordance with the findings of Broye 
and Weil (2008), public companies are more likely to choose a Big-4 
auditor since they have great incentives to convey their intention to 
provide accurate and reliable financial information. Furthermore, 
Table 4 correlations 
 INVREC Assets Debt_assets Z_score ROA Salesgrowth 
INVREC 1.000000 -0.080271 -0.024205 -0.091069 0.071782 -0.016100 
Assets -0.080271 1.000000 -0.003100 -0.097904 0.041255 -0.004657 
Debt_assets -0.024205 -0.003100 1.000000 0.028585 0.125548 -0.000667 
Z_score -0.091069 -0.097904 0.028585 1.000000 -0.293955 -0.001693 
ROA 0.071782 0.041255 0.125548 -0.293955 1.000000 0.014517 
Salesgrowth -0.016100 -0.004657 -0.000667 -0.001693 0.014517 1.000000 
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they are subjected to more complex environments and larger 
international networks. The first hypothesis that was tested included 
two characteristics of the companies‟ internal environment, its size 
and its transactional complexity. According to the regression 
analysis which was conducted and fully analyzed, the larger the 
firm, the more likely is to choose a Big-4 auditor. On the contrary, 
the internal complexity of a company seems to play a significant 
role in the auditor‟s selection but is negatively associated with the 
decision to select a Big-4 auditor. The second hypothesis that was 
tested refers to the way a company is financed. The outcome of the 
regression model is consistent with the predicted one. The higher 
the debt a company owns, the decision to engage with a high-
quality auditor becomes more likely. The third hypothesis that was 
tested predicted that companies with a growing demand for external 
financing are more likely to hire a high-quality auditor as they want 
to attract more easily capital inflow and to gain a lower cost of 
capital. However, the generated results of the regression show us 
that the variable incorporated with a view to reflect the need for 
external financing depicted a negative association with a Big-4 
preference and was reported as statistically insignificant. The last 
one hypothesis which contributes to previous researches is the 
investigation of the relationship between the financial distress of a 
company and its auditor choice. The famous variable z-score was 
calculated and incorporated in the model with a view to provide us 
with the appropriate information needed. Throughout the literature 
review there are adverse opinions regarding this issue.  It was 
derived from the value of the estimated coefficient that there is a 
strong relationship between the company‟s decision to hire a 
specific auditor and its financial distress. The negative sign though, 
was an indicator that a company which performs under tough 
financial condition is more likely to choose a non-Big-4 auditor. This 
finding is in accordance with the research of Titman and Truman 
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(1986), mentioned in the literature review part. They argued that 
when a company faces issues of financial difficulties and potential 
bankruptcy, it is more likely to choose a non-Big-4 auditor in order 
to conceal or distort the level of financial distress it experiences.  
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